sdk_lib: add GPG signature verification for SDK downloads - #4206
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prayag0one4 wants to merge 1 commit into
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sdk_lib: add GPG signature verification for SDK downloads#4206prayag0one4 wants to merge 1 commit into
prayag0one4 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Signed-off-by: Prayag <rajprayag014@gmail.com>
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While looking through the SDK download logic in
sdk_util.sh, I noticed there was aTODOleft behind about downloading the.ascfiles and verifying the GPG signatures.Right now, we only download the
.DIGESTSfile and use it to check the tarball's integrity. While that's great for catching corrupted downloads, it leaves the build pipeline vulnerable to a compromised mirror or a MitM attack, since a bad actor could easily swap out both the tarball and the digests file with malicious versions.This PR addresses that by finishing up the TODO. I updated the script to grab the
.DIGESTS.ascfile alongside the tarball, and added agpg --verifystep before we actually trust the hashes. This ensures the SDK artifacts are authentic and helps lock down our supply chain security.