feat(nip98): add Authorization header verifier

.changeset/nip98-auth-verifier.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"nostream": minor
+---
+
+feat(nip98): add Authorization header event verifier for HTTP auth (kind 27235)

.knip.json

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@
     "lzma-native"
   ],
   "ignore": [
-    ".nostr/**"
+    ".nostr/**",
+    "src/utils/nip98.ts"
   ],
   "commitlint": false,
   "eslint": false,

src/constants/base.ts

@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ export enum EventKinds {
   EPHEMERAL_FIRST = 20000,
   // NIP-42: Client Authentication
   AUTH = 22242,
+  // NIP-98: HTTP Auth
+  HTTP_AUTH = 27235,
   // NIP-43: Ephemeral access request kinds
   NIP43_JOIN_REQUEST = 28934,
   NIP43_INVITE_REQUEST = 28935,
@@ -95,6 +97,10 @@ export enum EventTags {
   // NIP-43: Relay Access Metadata
   Member = 'member',
   Claim = 'claim',
+  // NIP-98: HTTP Auth
+  Url = 'u',
+  Method = 'method',
+  Payload = 'payload',
 }
 
 export const ALL_RELAYS = 'ALL_RELAYS'

src/utils/nip98.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto'
+import { z } from 'zod'
+import { Pubkey } from '../@types/base'
+import { Event } from '../@types/event'
+import { EventKinds, EventTags } from '../constants/base'
+import { createdAtSchema, idSchema, kindSchema, pubkeySchema, signatureSchema, tagSchema } from '../schemas/base-schema'
+import { isEventIdValid, isEventSignatureValid } from './event'
+
+// NIP-98 suggests a ~60s window for kind 27235 auth events.
+export const DEFAULT_NIP98_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS = 60
+
+// A signed kind-27235 event is typically ~1–2KB encoded. Cap well above that to
+// reject pathological Authorization headers before JSON.parse / crypto work.
+export const DEFAULT_NIP98_MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_LENGTH = 8192
+
+const NOSTR_AUTH_SCHEME = /^Nostr$/i
+const LOWER_HEX_64 = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/
+const BASE64_TOKEN = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/
+
+// Lean NIP-01 shape only — avoids eventSchema superRefine (reactions, geohash, etc.).
+const nip98EventSchema = z
+  .object({
+    id: idSchema,
+    pubkey: pubkeySchema,
+    created_at: createdAtSchema,
+    kind: kindSchema,
+    tags: z.array(tagSchema),
+    content: z.string(),
+    sig: signatureSchema,
+  })
+  .strict()
+
+export type Nip98AuthSuccess = {
+  ok: true
+  pubkey: Pubkey
+  event: Event
+}
+
+export type Nip98AuthFailure = {
+  ok: false
+  reason: string
+}
+
+export type Nip98AuthResult = Nip98AuthSuccess | Nip98AuthFailure
+
+export type Nip98PayloadPolicy =
+  // Secure default for mutating admin APIs: non-empty bodies must bind via payload.
+  | 'require-when-body'
+  // Spec "MAY": only verify payload when the client included the tag.
+  | 'verify-if-present'
+  | 'ignore'
+
+export type VerifyNip98AuthInput = {
+  authorizationHeader: string | undefined | null
+  /** Absolute request URL, including query string. Compared exactly to the `u` tag. */
+  url: string
+  /** HTTP method as received (typically uppercase). Compared exactly to the `method` tag. */
+  method: string
+  /**
+   * Raw request body. Hashing uses the bytes directly (no intermediate copy for Buffer/Uint8Array).
+   * When omitted, payload policy is skipped.
+   */
+  body?: Buffer | Uint8Array | string
+  payloadPolicy?: Nip98PayloadPolicy
+  maxSkewSeconds?: number
+  maxAuthorizationHeaderLength?: number
+  /** Overrideable for deterministic tests. Defaults to Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000). */
+  nowSeconds?: number
+}
+
+export const hashNip98Payload = (body: Buffer | Uint8Array | string): string => {
+  const hash = createHash('sha256')
+  if (typeof body === 'string') {
+    hash.update(body, 'utf8')
+  } else {
+    hash.update(body)
+  }
+  return hash.digest('hex')
+}
+
+const fail = (reason: string): Nip98AuthFailure => ({ ok: false, reason })
+
+const bodyByteLength = (body: Buffer | Uint8Array | string): number =>
+  typeof body === 'string' ? Buffer.byteLength(body, 'utf8') : body.byteLength
+
+type Nip98AuthTags = {
+  url?: string
+  method?: string
+  payload?: string
+}
+
+const extractAuthTags = (tags: Event['tags']): Nip98AuthTags => {
+  const result: Nip98AuthTags = {}
+
+  for (const tag of tags) {
+    if (tag.length < 2) {
+      continue
+    }
+
+    switch (tag[0]) {
+      case EventTags.Url:
+        if (result.url === undefined) {
+          result.url = tag[1]
+        }
+        break
+      case EventTags.Method:
+        if (result.method === undefined) {
+          result.method = tag[1]
+        }
+        break
+      case EventTags.Payload:
+        if (result.payload === undefined) {
+          result.payload = tag[1]
+        }
+        break
+    }
+
+    if (result.url !== undefined && result.method !== undefined && result.payload !== undefined) {
+      break
+    }
+  }
+
+  return result
+}
+
+const parseAuthorizationEventJson = (
+  authorizationHeader: string | undefined | null,
+  maxAuthorizationHeaderLength: number,
+): Nip98AuthResult | string => {
+  if (typeof authorizationHeader !== 'string' || authorizationHeader.length === 0) {
+    return fail('missing authorization header')
+  }
+
+  if (authorizationHeader.length > maxAuthorizationHeaderLength) {
+    return fail('invalid authorization header')
+  }
+
+  const trimmed = authorizationHeader.trim()
+  const spaceIndex = trimmed.indexOf(' ')
+  if (spaceIndex <= 0) {
+    return fail('invalid authorization header')
+  }
+
+  const scheme = trimmed.slice(0, spaceIndex)
+  const token = trimmed.slice(spaceIndex + 1).replace(/\s+/g, '')
+  if (!NOSTR_AUTH_SCHEME.test(scheme) || token.length === 0) {
+    return fail('invalid authorization scheme')
+  }
+
+  if (!BASE64_TOKEN.test(token) || token.length % 4 !== 0) {
+    return fail('invalid authorization encoding')
+  }
+
+  return Buffer.from(token, 'base64').toString('utf8')
+}
+
+const isHexEqual = (left: string, right: string): boolean => {
+  if (left.length !== right.length || !LOWER_HEX_64.test(left) || !LOWER_HEX_64.test(right)) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  try {
+    return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(left, 'hex'), Buffer.from(right, 'hex'))
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+const verifyPayloadBinding = (
+  policy: Nip98PayloadPolicy,
+  body: Buffer | Uint8Array | string | undefined,
+  payloadTag: string | undefined,
+): Nip98AuthFailure | undefined => {
+  if (body === undefined || policy === 'ignore') {
+    return undefined
+  }
+
+  const expectedPayload = hashNip98Payload(body)
+  const hasBody = bodyByteLength(body) > 0
+
+  if (policy === 'require-when-body' && hasBody && payloadTag === undefined) {
+    return fail('invalid: missing payload tag')
+  }
+
+  if (payloadTag === undefined) {
+    return undefined
+  }
+
+  if (!isHexEqual(payloadTag.toLowerCase(), expectedPayload)) {
+    return fail('invalid: payload tag does not match request body')
+  }
+
+  return undefined
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cryptographically verifies a NIP-98 `Authorization: Nostr <base64-event>` header
+ * against the HTTP request URL, method, and optional body payload hash.
+ *
+ * Check order: cheap structural/kind/skew rejects first, then id+signature
+ * (authenticate the event), then u/method/payload (bind the authenticated event
+ * to this request).
+ */
+export const verifyNip98Auth = async (input: VerifyNip98AuthInput): Promise<Nip98AuthResult> => {
+  const maxAuthorizationHeaderLength =
+    input.maxAuthorizationHeaderLength ?? DEFAULT_NIP98_MAX_AUTHORIZATION_HEADER_LENGTH
+
+  const parsed = parseAuthorizationEventJson(input.authorizationHeader, maxAuthorizationHeaderLength)
+  if (typeof parsed !== 'string') {
+    return parsed
+  }
+
+  let raw: unknown
+  try {
+    raw = JSON.parse(parsed)
+  } catch {
+    return fail('invalid authorization event json')
+  }
+
+  const schemaResult = nip98EventSchema.safeParse(raw)
+  if (!schemaResult.success) {
+    return fail('invalid authorization event')
+  }
+
+  const event = schemaResult.data as unknown as Event
+
+  if (event.kind !== EventKinds.HTTP_AUTH) {
+    return fail('invalid: auth event must be kind 27235')
+  }
+
+  const maxSkewSeconds = input.maxSkewSeconds ?? DEFAULT_NIP98_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS
+  const nowSeconds = input.nowSeconds ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
+  if (Math.abs(nowSeconds - event.created_at) > maxSkewSeconds) {
+    return fail('invalid: created_at is too far from the current time')
+  }
+
+  // Authenticate before trusting tags for request binding.
+  if (!(await isEventIdValid(event))) {
+    return fail('invalid: event id does not match')
+  }
+
+  if (!(await isEventSignatureValid(event))) {
+    return fail('invalid: event signature verification failed')
+  }
+
+  const tags = extractAuthTags(event.tags)
+
+  if (tags.url === undefined) {
+    return fail('invalid: missing u tag')
+  }
+  if (tags.url !== input.url) {
+    return fail('invalid: u tag does not match request url')
+  }
+
+  if (tags.method === undefined) {
+    return fail('invalid: missing method tag')
+  }
+  if (tags.method !== input.method) {
+    return fail('invalid: method tag does not match request method')
+  }
+
+  const payloadFailure = verifyPayloadBinding(input.payloadPolicy ?? 'require-when-body', input.body, tags.payload)
+  if (payloadFailure) {
+    return payloadFailure
+  }
+
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    pubkey: event.pubkey,
+    event,
+  }
+}

test/unit/cli/info.spec.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-const { expect } = require('chai')
-const fs = require('fs')
-const path = require('path')
-const sinon = require('sinon')
+import { expect } from 'chai'
+import fs from 'fs'
+import path from 'path'
+import sinon from 'sinon'
 
 const infoCommand = require('../../../dist/src/cli/commands/info.js')
 const configUtils = require('../../../dist/src/cli/utils/config.js')
@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ describe('runInfo', () => {
 
   it('outputs valid JSON when docker is not installed (ENOENT)', async () => {
     sinon.stub(fs, 'existsSync').returns(false)
-    sinon.stub(processUtils, 'runCommandWithOutput').resolves({ ok: false, reason: 'not-found', stdout: '', stderr: '' })
+    sinon
+      .stub(processUtils, 'runCommandWithOutput')
+      .resolves({ ok: false, reason: 'not-found', stdout: '', stderr: '' })
 
     const code = await infoCommand.runInfo({ json: true })