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ci: pin pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish to v1.14.3 for GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9 - #1752
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The advisory, critical, covers every version up to 1.14.2, after revocation of a CA in the Sigstore chain used for Trusted Publishing and PyPI attestations. Same change as #1748 on next. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ladon verdict: Approve
Approve — security pin bump, no blocking findings.
This PR changes a single line in .github/workflows/release-publish.yml, bumping pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish from v1.13.0 to v1.14.3 (SHA 7245906), closing GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9 (revoked Sigstore CA affecting Trusted Publishing/attestations). The reviewer verified it targets the correct attested-publish step — the one with id-token: write under the release-publish environment — and that the change is SHA-pinned with a version comment, matching sibling PR #1748 on next.
No findings were reported (critical/high/medium/low all empty). Decision table applied top-down: rows 1–8 do not fire (no findings, gated_paths false, high_risk false, no team gate, no prior decision), so the outcome falls through to row 9 = approve. Note that review_decision is REVIEW_REQUIRED, but with gated_paths: false that does not trigger row 2.
One non-blocking follow-up from the reviewer: the SHA↔v1.14.3 tag binding could not be re-verified offline — confirm the commented tag matches the pinned digest before merge.
Same one-line change as #1748 on
next. GHSA-5xjx-3w67-w9x9 is critical and coverspypa/gh-action-pypi-publishup to 1.14.2, after revocation of a CA in the Sigstore chain used for Trusted Publishing and PyPI attestations.mainstill pins v1.13.0, so the next 9.x release would publish with it. The advisory also fails the Workflow security job on every branch.🤖 Generated with Claude Code