diff --git a/.changeset/fix-unattended-approval.md b/.changeset/fix-unattended-approval.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..98ea0e73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/fix-unattended-approval.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+---
+'@moonshot-ai/agent-core-v2': patch
+---
+
+Refuse instead of blocking when a tool needs approval in an unattended
+session. Auto mode is documented as "fully autonomous, the agent will not ask
+questions" and headless runs (`kimi -p`) turn it on for the whole session, so a
+tool that falls outside auto-approval had nobody to answer its request and the
+process waited forever. It now resolves as a refusal that names the tool and
+says how to grant it deliberately.
+
+`FetchURL` joins `Bash` in the set auto mode does not blanket-approve: it sends
+caller-chosen bytes to a caller-chosen host, and an unattended session is
+exactly where that would go unnoticed.
diff --git a/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/permissionPolicy/policies/auto-mode-approve.ts b/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/permissionPolicy/policies/auto-mode-approve.ts
index 9a2cf273..16c2fc06 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/permissionPolicy/policies/auto-mode-approve.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/permissionPolicy/policies/auto-mode-approve.ts
@@ -14,11 +14,15 @@ import type { ResolvedToolExecutionHookContext } from '#/agent/toolExecutor/tool
  * model picked up — including one that arrived in a repo file, an issue, or a
  * fetched page — into an unreviewed shell execution.
  *
- * Excluding it here does not deny it: the call falls through to the rest of
- * the chain, so a user `[permission] allow` rule still authorizes it. That
+ * `FetchURL` is here for the matching reason on the way out: it sends
+ * caller-chosen bytes to a caller-chosen host, and an unattended session is
+ * exactly where nobody would notice it happening.
+ *
+ * Excluding them here does not deny them: the call falls through to the rest
+ * of the chain, so a user `[permission] allow` rule still authorizes it. That
  * makes the grant explicit and auditable instead of implied by the mode.
  */
-const AUTO_MODE_EXCLUDED_TOOLS = new Set<string>(['Bash']);
+const AUTO_MODE_EXCLUDED_TOOLS = new Set<string>(['Bash', 'FetchURL']);
 
 /**
  * Escape hatch for operators who accept the risk and need the previous
diff --git a/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/toolApproval/toolApprovalService.ts b/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/toolApproval/toolApprovalService.ts
index 863fc274..e0eaf966 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/toolApproval/toolApprovalService.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core-v2/src/agent/toolApproval/toolApprovalService.ts
@@ -129,15 +129,27 @@ export class AgentToolApprovalService extends Service implements IAgentToolAppro
     const startedAt = Date.now();
 
     let response: ApprovalResponse;
-    const approvalService = this.tryApprovalService();
+    // Auto mode is documented as "fully autonomous, the agent will not ask
+    // questions", and headless runs (`kimi -p`) turn it on for the whole
+    // session. Nobody is there to answer, so going to the broker would block
+    // until the process is killed. Treat it like a missing broker and refuse.
+    // Mirrors `auto-mode-ask-user-question-deny`, which solves the same
+    // problem for AskUserQuestion.
+    const unattended = this.modeService.mode === 'auto';
+    const approvalService = unattended ? undefined : this.tryApprovalService();
     if (approvalService === undefined) {
-      // Fail closed. Reaching here means a policy decided this call needs
-      // confirmation, but no broker is bound to ask (an embedding host that
-      // never wired one up). Treating "nobody to ask" as consent would let
-      // every gated tool call through unreviewed.
+      // Fail closed. A policy decided this call needs confirmation and there
+      // is no one to confirm it — either the session is unattended, or no
+      // broker was bound (an embedding host that never wired one up).
+      // Treating "nobody to ask" as consent would let every gated tool call
+      // through unreviewed.
       response = {
         decision: 'rejected',
-        feedback: 'No approval broker is available to confirm this tool call.',
+        feedback: unattended
+          ? `"${name}" needs approval and this session is running unattended (auto mode). ` +
+            `Allow it explicitly with a [permission] allow rule in config.toml, ` +
+            `or run interactively so the request can be answered.`
+          : 'No approval broker is available to confirm this tool call.',
       };
     } else {
       this.eventBus.publish({ type: 'permission.approval.requested', ...approvalContext });
diff --git a/packages/agent-core-v2/test/agent/toolApproval/toolApproval.test.ts b/packages/agent-core-v2/test/agent/toolApproval/toolApproval.test.ts
index b47d08ee..50f71e6a 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core-v2/test/agent/toolApproval/toolApproval.test.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core-v2/test/agent/toolApproval/toolApproval.test.ts
@@ -277,6 +277,24 @@ describe('AgentToolApprovalService', () => {
       });
     });
 
+
+    it('refuses instead of blocking when the session is unattended', async () => {
+      // Auto mode is documented as never asking, and headless runs turn it on.
+      // Going to the broker there would wait for a decision that never comes.
+      mode = 'auto';
+      const request = useBroker(async () => ({ decision: 'approved' }));
+
+      const result = await make().requestToolApproval(
+        makeContext('Bash', { command: 'echo hi' }),
+        ask(),
+        'fallback-ask',
+      );
+
+      expect(request).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(result).toMatchObject({ veto: { isError: true } });
+      expect((result as { veto: { output: string } }).veto.output).toContain('unattended');
+    });
+
     it('publishes approval events around the broker round-trip', async () => {
       const events = subscribeApprovalEvents();
       const request = useBroker(async () => ({